Friedrich Nietzsche and international relations theory have an uncomfortable relationship at best. The implicit dismissal of Nietzsche in International Relations (IR) is especially clear in theories of cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism. Collective action is often pursued through an explicit (neo) Kantian liberal internationalist model. Nietzsche is seen as a radical theorist of individuality unsuited for communitarian models, and unfortunately, his work is often implicated in the rise of the Third Reich rather than being used as a solution set for later instances of egregious violence. This paper is an exploration into the value of Nietzsche’s thought for international relations theory; its goal is to question the assumptions of the dominant paradigms in IR through an engagement with humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. Pity and nobility are the paths in Nietzsche’s thought that best allow us to re-conceptualize humanitarianism in such a way that may expose paradoxes in our current conceptions of the “subject” of violence. Pity, as Nietzsche defines it, contaminates humanitarianism with its hatred of life and strength. Through Nietzsche, we can see that one of humanitarianism’s greatest weaknesses is its continued reliance on appeals to pity that then creates a powerless “victim” that cannot affirm life, only escape grisly death through someone else’s “aid,” and that this has made humanitarianism in all forms less effective than it could be. I argue that Nietzsche’s disparagement of pity can lead us, through his idea of nobility, to a creation of a new subject, to an end that turns the pity back upon the one who pities and away from a pitiful subject with no agency. This is not meant as a condemnation of the humanitarian movement, but an exploration into the possibility of an immanent theory of humanitarianism that moves away from its transcendental origins that strip away individual agency and power.